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Abstract 
This paper employs a multinomial logit model to examine what determines the choice 
of a particular  firm for a given privatisation method. A variety of hypotheses about 
possible determinants of ownership change are tested using an extensive data set for  
Polish manufacturing at the beginning of transition. The results at a firm as well as at 
a sector level give strong support to the hypothesis of the importance of resource 
constraints on the choice of ownership. Large firms with high financing requirement 
are more likely to be owned by outsiders. High sectoral capital intensity discourages 
small insider owned firms while high degree of product differentiation is a constraint  
for different investors, with the exception of outsiders. We also find that firm quality, 
measured by profitability and exporting outside the Soviet block, appeals to all types 
of investors but, additionally, privatisation offers outsiders ways of entering sectors 
with substantial entry barriers.  
JEL classification: P21, P31, L33, C25 
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1. Introduction
East European countries  at the beginning of transition were characterised by  a very 
small private sector. Initial dramatic increases in the size of the private sector have to 
be attributed mainly to privatisation in the narrow sense. This narrow sense 
privatisation is based on the ownership transfer of assets and production facilities of 
the former state sector, rather than growth of the indigenous private sector  starting 
new investment projects. Only some firms were chosen for privatisation and this 
process of selection of enterprises is not well documented and analysed. At the same 
time, the initial characteristics of the privatised firms and those remaining in the state-
sector are of vital importance in making future comparisons between the performance 
of the private and state sector.  
Megginson and Netter (2001) comment on a limited understanding of the 
determinants of privatisation and stress the need for different privatisation methods 
for different types of assets. In the context of transition, the emphasis is on the 
relationship between privatisation and performance, rather than the determinants of 
privatisation (see e.g. Djankov and Murrell, 2002 for a survey)
1. At the same time it is 
recognised that the endogeneity of the timing and method of privatisation complicates 
any attempts to establish a casual relationship between privatisation and performance 
(Carlin and Landesmann, 1997). 
1 More recently  competition and policy reforms, rather than ownership as such,  are identified as 
important factors  affecting restructuring and performance (see e.g. Carlin et al (2001), Aghion et al 
(2002), Angelucci et al (2002)).  3
In this paper we focus on the process of selection of state-owned enterprises for 
privatisation and the choice of privatisation methods. A multinomial logit model is 
employed to examine what determines the choice of a particular  firm for a given 
privatisation method. Both firm-level as well as industry specific characteristics are 
examined in order to determine their impact on ownership change. A unique dataset is 
employed which is constructed by linking the database of all privatisation transactions 
recorded by the Polish Ministry of Ownership Transformation in the period 1990-
1993 and the database compiled from the financial statements of all state-owned 
enterprises which were eligible for privatisation. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing work on the 
determinants of ownership. In section 3 the privatisation programme in Poland is 
briefly presented. Data sources and the modelling framework are described in section 
4. The empirical results are discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2.  Determinants of ownership – empirical evidence
When analysing ownership types, the main distinction lies between state-owned and 
private enterprises. Levy (1988) examines the pattern of manufacturing ownership in 
developing countries. He extends the industrial economics analysis of multinationals 
to predict the division of ownership between domestic private and state-owned firms. 
The empirical analysis confirms that state-owned (and foreign) firms are more likely 
to participate in technology-intensive sectors of industry than private firms. Also,  4
private local firms are disadvantaged in their access to capital, which is seen through a 
small share of domestic private firms in sectors where capital requirements are large. 
McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) are interested in the fact of ownership change rather 
than in the type of new owner involved and how this is  related to productivity. One 
hypothesis is that firms with high productivity are more likely to experience 
ownership change, because good firms are more attractive than bad ones. In contrast 
to this, under matching hypothesis, plants with low productivity due to poor match are 
more likely to change owners than those with good matches. This is motivated by the 
gains available from replacing the managers of badly performing firms. 
Individual firm characteristics feature prominently in take-over activity literature 
where probability of acquisition taking place depends on observable and unobservable 
characteristics of a target in relation to the acquirer. These target characteristics 
usually refer to size, growth, profitability and stock market valuation (see e.g. 
Thompson, 1997) but general macroeconomic conditions are taken into account when 
acquisitions over a longer period of time are analysed (see e.g. Golbe and White, 
1988).
In transition literature the issue of the determinants of ownership structures and their 
changes usually  arises in the context of studies of ownership and performance. Many 
early studies that focussed solely on making performance comparisons failed to find 
any systematic relationship between ownership type and enterprise performance  (see 
EBRD, 1995). Later on it has been recognised that this might be due to the 
assumption of no selection bias in privatisation. 5
The problem of selectivity can be addressed in different ways. For example, when 
analysing the impact of ownership on performance, Frydman et al (1999)  use a fixed 
effects model in order to insulate their conclusions against the arguments that better 
firms might have been chosen for some types of privatisation. Marcinein and van 
Wijnbergen (1997) in their analysis of Czech privatisation assume that enterprises 
were selected for privatisation non-randomly. They apply Heckman two-step 
regression and estimate a selection rule first before analysing several measures of 
performance. In particular, they  conclude that undercapitalised, low profit companies 
were the most likely to be selected for pure voucher privatisation. Similarly, Smith et 
al (1997) use a two-stage Tobit procedure to control for simultaneity between 
privatisation and firm performance during spontaneous privatisation  in Slovenia. 
They predict employee and foreign ownership shares as determined by a range of  
factors such as exports, profits, long- and short-term foreign credit. In general, there 
are some studies with primary interest in  the impact of privatisation on performance 
but they examine the determinants of ownership change so that predicted ownership 
shares can be used later on as explanatory variables in performance analysis. 
In contrast to this, Jones and Mygind (1999) specifically concentrate on ownership 
changes rather than the link between privatisation and performance. They use a Tobit 
model to explain the extent of a particular form of ownership  (employee, manager, 
foreign, domestic outsider and state). They also look at ownership transformations, 
such as transition from insiders to outsiders, and use a multinomial logit to evaluate 
the probability of a particular type of transformation. Possible determinants of  6
ownership such as size, capital intensity and financing requirement are included, 
together with a group of factors capturing the quality of a firm
2.
Grosfeld and Hashi (2003) assess the evolution of the ownership structure among the 
firms privatised through two different  mass privatisation  programmes: the Czech 
voucher scheme and the Polish National Investment Funds. The concentration of 
ownership is determined by a variety of firm specific characteristics such as size, 
investment, leverage and type of shareholder. It also depends on the degree of 
uncertainty in the firm’s environment.   
On the whole, the studies involving  ownership change analyse a variety of processes 
ranging from initial selection for mass privatisation to subsequent ownership 
transformations within the private sector. There is, however, some overlap in the 
variables included as determinants of ownership structure. 
3.  The privatisation programme in Poland
In order to transform an economy dominated by state-owned enterprises a 
privatisation programme was needed. Different methods ranging from outright sales 
to free distribution were adopted in different countries. The methods involved can be 
broadly classified  using different criteria. The main  distinction is made between 
selling or giving away. A second distinction is whether the assets are transferred to 
2 Jones et al (2003) use more recent data to analyse the impact of resource constraints and risk aversion 
on ownership transformations in Estonia.  7
insiders, managers or workers, or to outside foreign or domestic investors. Top-down 
privatisation, where the government takes the initiative in privatising a firm is 
contrasted with bottom-up privatisation, with the managers of a firm playing an 
important role. 
In 1990 the Polish parliament approved the Law on Privatisation of State-Owned 
Enterprises and founded the Office of Ownership Transformation. The legislation 
facilitated three main methods of privatisation  (Bornstein, 1997). Under ‘capital 
privatisation’ some state-owned enterprises were to be transformed into joint-stock 
companies to be sold to private investors. The Ministry of Ownership Transformation 
started this process by transforming a state-owned enterprise into a joint stock 
company with the state as a single shareholder, although often the initiative belonged 
to the enterprise concerned. Privatisation through ‘liquidation’ was very popular. 
Under this procedure, a given state-owned enterprise is dissolved and its assets are 
sold, transferred to another company or leased. This method can be applied to two 
types of enterprises. Insolvent enterprises are closed down and their assets sold but the 
legislation allows for solvent enterprises ceasing to exist, with their assets acquired by 
a new private company. Although the programme of mass privatisation did not come 
into operation until much later, between 1990 and 1993 some enterprises were 
designated for this method of privatisation. This leads to four possible paths of 
privatisation: 
- by  sale 
- mass  privatisation 
-  dissolution in order to privatise 
-  dissolution because of bankruptcy.  8
The first method should guarantee an outsider ownership, while mass privatising 
usually leads to dispersed ownership. The remaining two methods are often associated 
with assets acquired by the insiders. 
4. Data sources and model description
The Polish Central Statistical Office routinely collects data from all firms 
employing five or more workers, using a questionnaire which covers different aspects 
of firm performance. The coverage is very high and the firms in the database 
represent around 90% of manufacturing sales. We use the database containing 
company balance sheets to select all state-owned firms which were eligible for 
privatisation. Privatisation episodes are reported to the Central Statistical Office at the 
point when privatisation proceedings are initiated using special  questionnaires, 
stating the type of privatisation method involved. We use these questionnaires to 
identify the firms being privatised in a given year. Then we obtain past characteristics 
from their balance sheets and their profit and loss accounts in the original database. 
We also use the main  database to evaluate some industry level characteristics such  as 
concentration or sectoral capital intensity. Our data covers privatisations which took 
place between 1990 and 1993 and firm-level characteristics go back to 1988. The 
number of cases of privatisation we start with coincides with the totals given in the 
report on the progress in privatisation (Ministry of Ownership Transformation, 1995). 
Some observations had to be excluded due to incomplete data. In the end our analysis 
covers some 800 cases of privatisation, with around 3000 state-owned enterprises in 
each year.   9
Our analytical framework is inspired by the models of take-over activity. Take-over 
can broadly be seen as a response to changes in economic environment that make 
some assets less productive in their current use than they would be in some alternative 
use (Hall, 1988). For this reason a rearrangement of productive assets is needed. The 
value of assets of a particular firm can be denoted as  V(X) = V(X1, X2, …), where X 
is a vector of firm characteristics. It is not necessary to identify the value function 
with the current stock market value of the firm. There are two types of firms: the 
acquiring ones, subscripted j, and the possible targets, subscripted i. Firm j will buy 
firm i if  
Vj(Xi) – Pi  > Vj(Xk) – Pk     for all firms k in the sample. 
Pi and Pk are the prices the acquiring firm j will have to pay for i’s and k’s assets 
respectively, and Vj(Xi) is the gain to firm j attributable to the acquisition of i.  
This gain can be partitioned into observable and unobservable components as follows: 
Vj(Xi) – Pi = f(Xi, Xj) + Hij
where f(Xi, Xj) is a function of observable characteristics of the acquirers and the 
potential targets and  Hij  is an error term. The probability that an acquisition will take 
place can be obtained from a multinomial logit model  
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where C is the entire pool of firms available for acquisition. 
In order to model privatisation in Eastern Europe this framework has to be modified 
in two ways. First, instead of thinking about two different types of firms and the 
relationship between the characteristics of the acquiring firm and those of the acquired 
firm, we need to focus  solely on the characteristics of potential targets. It is possible  10
though to consider different types of acquisitions, corresponding to different methods 
of privatisation. The statement ‘j buying i’ should then  mean a particular type of 
buyer j acquiring  a target rather than firm j acquiring some other firm. This 
framework, based on a multinomial model,  is essential in investigating how different 
characteristics of a target are valued by different types of investors. Second, it may 
not be possible to include prices Pi and Pk in the valuation expression. This 
information may not be available alongside information on firm-level characteristics. 
Also, under some privatisation methods the assets of privatised firms are distributed 
free.
We model the probability of firm i being chosen for a given privatisation method 
depending on their current and past characteristics. There are four different methods 
of privatisation, as outlined in section 3. The firms remaining state-owned are a 
comparison group. All state-owned firms surviving till the following year provide a 
pool of firms available for privatisation. 
It is expected that  particular firm characteristics will make them attractive to different 
types of investors who have different objectives and who may face different budget 
constraints. In the first place we include Size, measured by the number of employees.  
It is predicted that large firms will be more attractive to outsiders such as  institutional 
investors. Insiders such as managers or employees are less likely to invest in large 
firms because they cannot afford to do so or because they are more risk averse.  
Another determinant may be the quality of the firm (Earle and Estrin, 1997). In 
principle, all types of investors should be interested in high performing firms. On the  11
other hand, workers in poor performing firms might be more concerned with   
preserving their jobs and inclined to acquire their failing firms. We measure quality 
by firm profitability and productivity. We also take into account  past profitability
and growth in sales and introduce a dummy variable old to identify firms that existed 
before 1990. As there is a lot of empirical evidence that exporters are performing 
better than non-exporters (see e.g. Bernard and Jensen,1999), we also include the  
share of exports in total output as a potential indicator of quality. For the period 
before the collapse of the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Aid) we examine the 
share of exports outside the Eastern block, rather than the share of total exports. This 
coincides with Walsh and Whelan (2000) who make a distinction between the CMEA 
and EU trade to conclude that  inherited trade orientation is an important determinant 
of performance. Firms that are EU trade oriented perform significantly better than 
those firms that inherited products historically produced for the CMEA markets under 
central planning. Trade orientation is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if a firm 
exports outside the CMEA block. 
There are also some other characteristics that might put off certain types of investors. 
In particular, some firms might show signs of financial distress, making them less 
attractive to investors. We measure financial distress by the amount of interest 
payments arrears. The negative characteristics might also apply to capital intensity 
and financing requirement. Compared to outsiders, insiders are less likely to invest 
in capital intensive and investment intensive firms. Moreover, financing needs are 
presumed to constrain large foreign and institutional investors less than individual 
small  investors.  We measure financing requirement by short-term credit.   12
Many of the above firm characteristics attracting or deterring different types of 
investors can also be interpreted in terms of  risk and uncertainty. Investors  who 
value current consumption over uncertain future consumption would choose a more 
profitable firm. Insiders are usually considered more risk averse and for this reason 
insider ownership should be associated with higher profits.  
There are also some hypotheses regarding different privatisation methods. Sale of 
assets is considered preferable on the grounds of  improving efficiency and generating 
government revenue. On the other hand, relying exclusively on this method would be 
too slow and mass privatisation was pursued to overcome shortage of finance and to 
increase public support. This might imply that ‘better’ enterprises were chosen for 
privatisation by sale rather than for mass privatisation. There is also some ambiguity 
about the role played by insiders in influencing  the process of selection and pre-
privatisation performance of their enterprises. 
Our specifications also include some sectoral variables. The rationale is as follows. 
The privatisation programme was also seen as a way of restructuring certain sectors of 
the economy and privatisation is equivalent to leaving the state-sector and entering the 
private sector. For this reason factors included in standard models of entry and exit 
(see e.g. Shapiro and Khemani, 1987 and Geroski, 1995) could be useful in explaining 
the determinants of ownership change. Also, some investors might be interested in a 
particular firm because of their industry affiliations. It might be the attractiveness of 
certain sectors rather than the characteristics of a firm that appeal to potential 
investors. Among sectoral variables we include concentration (measured by a four-
firm sales concentration ratio C4), the degree of turnover (measured by entry rate),  13
profitability and capital intensity. The consumer-good dummy is added to proxy 
entry barriers associated with product differentiation. Following Roberts and 
Thompson (2003), the size of the state-owned sector (measured by the proportion of 
state-owned firms in the total number of firms in a given industry) is included to 
allow for additional barriers in a transitional economy.  
5. Empirical results
5.1 Determinants of privatisation 
First we model the probability of being selected  for a different privatisation method  
using a range of  firm level characteristics. There are four possible paths of 
privatisation and the  firms remaining state-owned are a comparison group. State-
owned manufacturing firms potentially eligible for privatisation and the cases of 
privatisations taking place between 1990 and 1993 are pooled giving us over 8000 
firms to be analysed. The multinomial logit estimates are reported in Table 1, with 
each column representing a separate set of estimates for a different privatisation 
method. 
Size is significant for all four methods but firms chosen for sale or mass privatisation 
are larger than their state-owned counterparts. In contrast, dissolved firms tend to be 
much smaller. The impact of capital and investment intensity varies for different 
privatisation methods but it is usually insignificant. Short-term credit has a significant  14
effect on the selection process. The probability of being privatised is positively related 
to the short-term credit for enterprises privatised by sale as well as for those chosen 
for mass privatisation. On the other hand, high short-term credit puts off  smaller 
investors and reduces an enterprise’s chances of being privatised by dissolution. The 
coefficients by size and by short-term credit give strong support to the hypothesis of 
the importance of resource constraints on the choice of ownership (Jones et al 2003). 
Consistent with predictions  by Aghion and Blanchard (1998), large firms with high 
financing requirement are more likely to be owned by outsiders. 
The relationship between the probability of being privatised and productivity is 
nonlinear. The coefficient on the squared term of productivity is negative although not 
always significant. This suggests that productivity, as a sign of quality of a firm, 
yields decreasing returns beyond a certain level.  If productivity is not treated as a 
quality indicator but serves to denote the scope for efficiency gains, our results give 
support to matching hypothesis as ownership changes are more likely at low level of 
productivity. In the context of transition this is consistent with the hypothesis that 
privatisation is driven by efficiency motives and for this reason government should 
privatise the least efficient firms first (Gupta et al 2001). Privatisation is a necessary 
restructuring process for lower productivity firms, while higher productivity firms are 
not privatised because restructuring to improve efficiency is not required.  
Privatised firms are profitable with the exception of firms dissolved because of 
bankruptcy. Interest arrears are only significant for enterprises dissolved because of 
their financial condition and the sign is positive. The probability of being privatised is 
positively related to the export share for privatisation by sale and for mass  15
privatisation but negatively related for privatisation by other methods. This effect is 
significant only for privatisation by sale. However, trade orientation is significant for 
all methods but privatisation via bankruptcy, although the strength of this effect 
varies. Trade orientation rather than export intensity seems to be a better indicator of 
the quality of a firm. The coefficient by the dummy variable ‘old’ is significant for all 
methods except privatisation by dissolution, indicating that enterprises chosen for this 
method might have undergone some restructuring (for example a break-up) before 
being offered for privatisation. In contrast to this, the enterprises selected for other 
methods existed in the same form before 1990. This gives some support to the 
hypothesis that insiders exerted control over the privatisation process. There is no 
evidence though that most profitable enterprises went to insiders.  In fact, the best 
enterprises were privatised by sale. 
The interpretation of the results based directly on the coefficients is promoted in 
Verbeek (2000), p. 196, with a positive coefficient implying that positive utility is 
attached to the corresponding characteristic. However, Powers and Xie (2000), p. 231, 
warn that the marginal effects for multinomial models can be ambiguous and 
recommend the interpretation based on odds and odds-ratio for a binomial logit model 
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where y is a dependent variable,  and E is a coefficient by di . 
For a continuous variable, we can construct the odds for value x+c, relative to the 
odds with value x as  16
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where J is the relevant coefficient. 
Following this interpretation, the odds of being privatised by sale (versus remaining 
state-owned) for an exporter to a non-CMEA area (Trade orientation = 1) are 2.49 
times those of other firms. The odds of being chosen for mass privatisation, based on 
trade orientation only and keeping other determinants constant, are even higher (6.63 
times the odds for firms not exporting outside the Eastern block). The odds of being 
privatised increase with profitability for all methods but privatisation via bankruptcy. 
In particular, a change in profitability by 10 percentage points increases the odds of 
being privatised by sale by 38%, and the odds of being chosen for mass privatisation 
by 22%. Size, measured by employment, is a significant determinant of privatisation 
although it enters the logit regression with a different sign for different methods. The 
estimated coefficients indicate that for a firm with one thousand less employees the 
odds  of privatisation by dissolution and by bankruptcy increase by 58% and 89% 
respectively. 
We also examined how some relative characteristics of different enterprises affect 
their chances of privatisation. In particular we introduced relative profitability and 
capital intensity measured by deviations from sectoral averages. The variables 
displayed the pattern of significance very similar to that in Table 1 and we do not 
report the estimates here.  
In Table 2 we include past profitability and growth but the selection of firms is 
restricted to those for which past observations are available. Surprisingly, growth is 
insignificant when explaining the determinants of privatisation by sale. Growing firms  17
are less likely to be selected for mass privatisation and less likely to face dissolution 
through bankruptcy procedures. Past profitability, although it displays the expected 
sign, is not always significant. Perhaps information on past performance is not as 
easily available as more current characteristics, or investors do not consider past 
performance a good indictor of a firm’s future prospects. Past profitability is 
significant in the estimates for firms privatised  following bankruptcy and it enters 
with a negative sign. This is confirmation that firms were going bankrupt as a result of 
long-term problems. With past characteristics added, some variables, such as interest 
arrears,   lose significance altogether. 
While explaining the determinants of ownership change, we also introduce some 
sectoral variables. The results of multinomial regression with firm-level as well as 
industry-specific  characteristics are given in Table 3. In general, the firm-level 
variables display a very similar pattern to that seen in Table 1. There is also a number 
of significant sectoral variables. 
For dissolved enterprises, the size of the state sector is negatively related to the 
probability of being privatised, implying that the larger the state sector the less likely 
privatisation by dissolution. This effect might be associated with the time profile of 
privatisation. Privatisation by sale and the selection for mass privatisation took place 
at the very beginning of transition. Later on, when the state-owned sector was 
becoming smaller as a result of new private firms entering, government had to resort 
to other methods of privatisation in order to speed up the process of ownership 
transformation. Although the sign by the size of state sector is as expected, the 
coefficient is only significant for the firms dissolved in order to be privatised.  18
While firm-level profitability is important in all privatisation methods, sectoral 
profitability is only significant for mass privatisation, and the sign is negative. 
Sectoral profitability does not seem to be a factor attracting the investors. Sectoral 
capital intensity is negative and significant for firms dissolved for privatisation, 
coinciding with Levy’s (1988) prediction that small private firms are disadvantaged in 
sectors with high capital and financial requirement.  
High concentration might have added to the attractiveness of certain enterprises 
because of their position in relatively monopolised industries rather than because of 
their individual characteristics. Consistent  with this statement the coefficient by 
concentration has the expected sign but is insignificant for most methods.  In contrast 
to this, for privatisation because of bankruptcy, concentration is significant and enters 
with the negative sign, confirming that this method of privatisation is associated with 
later stages, when the state-sector was smaller and concentration level was lower. The 
coefficient by entry rate is consistently negative suggesting that privatisation might 
have been a way of entering sectors with substantial barriers to entry. This coefficient 
is significant, though, for privatisation by sale and mass privatisation only.  The sign 
and the significance level for the coefficient by the consumer industry dummy varies 
but there is evidence that enterprises privatised by sale are more likely to manufacture 
consumer goods, while those chosen for mass privatisation are more likely to come 
from producer goods industries. This confirms that product differentiation is not a 
constraint for outsiders, while other types of investors are put off by the prospect of 
high advertising expenditure and non-price competition.  19
5.2 The sequence of privatisation 
In the previous section we investigated the choice of firms for different privatisation 
methods. Here we explore another important aspect of transition, namely that not all 
firms were privatised simultaneously. This gives rise to the issue of sequencing of 
privatisation  (Gupta et al, 2001). We approach this by investigating how firms 
changed in the run up to privatisation and whether those privatised first were different 
from those privatised later. For this purpose the data used in the previous section has 
been reorganised to form  a panel. 
The model of the probability of privatisation, accounting for individual characteristics 
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where yit = 1 if firm i is privatised at time t (Greene, p. 899). We consider jointly 
privatisation by sale, mass privatisation and privatisation by dissolution but exclude 
firms dissolved because of bankruptcy as they showed characteristics different from 
other privatised firms. The list of explanatory variables is similar to the one 
considered in the previous specifications. However, the fixed effects estimator 
eliminates any time-invariant variables from the model, so characteristics such as 
trade orientation are dropped. 
The resulting data set is an unbalanced panel, where up to 3 observations might be 
available for a particular firm. However, many firms have to be excluded because of  20
the requirements of fixed effects estimation. First, firms for which only one 
observation exists are discarded from estimation. Also, those firms that are not 
privatised over the period under consideration  are dropped due to all negative 
outcomes. In the end we are left with around 350 firms. All those firms were 
privatised at some point and those that remained state-owned had to be excluded. It 
should be stressed that even though the model considered here looks similar to the 
specifications used in the previous section, its interpretation is very different. We still 
model probability of being privatised but the reference groups is no longer  the pool 
of all firms eligible for privatisation. What we are doing  here is to compare the firms 
at the point of privatisation with those that have not yet been privatised.  
The results of fixed effects estimation are given in Table 4. Four different 
specifications are considered corresponding to the specifications in Tables1-3. We 
also introduce a specification with relative profitability and capital intensity, 
measured  by deviations from sectoral averages. 
Size is insignificant in all specifications, indicating that enterprises at the point of 
privatisation are not different, size-wise,  from what they were before. In the run-up to 
privatisation absolute profitability declines but there is no significant effect in terms 
of relative profitability. A  significant, negative coefficient by the export share in 
some specifications suggests that quality of firm, measured by export capability, 
might deteriorate. Similarly, a significant positive coefficient by interest arrears in one 
of the specifications is another sign of deteriorating quality. Capital intensity also 
declines in absolute terms, which does not need to be a sign of asset stripping, but 
might reflect general trends in a given sector, as relative capital intensity turns out  21
insignificant. Higher level of investment in relation to output increases chances of 
privatisation, as firm-level specifications indicate. For enterprises at the point of 
privatisation, their short-term credit is less than it used to be, which might indicate the 
reluctance of banks to offer credit to enterprises in the run-up to a major ownership 
transformation.
When sectoral variables are included, all firm level variables become insignificant. At 
the same time all sectoral variables are significant and display the signs encountered 
in some of the previous experiments. Enterprises from sectors with lower sectoral 
profitability and capital intensity are more likely to be privatised. Also, after 
accounting for individual characteristics, and looking among the pool of firms to be 
privatised at some point, it turns out that the occurrence  of  privatisation is associated 
with a declining state sector, decreasing concentration and lower entry barriers.  
We use information about the identity of individual firms to identify those privatised 
straightaway or later on and compare enterprises chosen for privatisation ‘in the first 
wave’ and those that were left out and chosen for privatisation later on. The pool of 
firms privatised straightaway is not restricted to  those privatised in the year the 
privatisation programme was launched.  Some of those firms might have been 
privatised later into transition but they were new entities, sometimes created as an 
effect of restructuring. The firms labelled as ‘privatised later’ are those for which we 
have more observations, indicating that, even though they were eligible for 
privatisation at a particular point in time, they were not chosen and they joined the 
pool of eligible firms again to be privatised in the next period. We run a simple 
multinomial logit model and present the marginal effects of firm characteristics on the  22
probability of being privatised in Table 5. Size and profitability are significant for all 
privatisation methods but the strength of this effect differs for different privatisation 
methods. Export share is only significant for privatisation by sale. 
On the whole, in contrast to Gupta et al (2001), we do not find strong evidence that 
more profitable firms were privatised. The view  that the best firms were chosen for 
privatisation first is only confirmed for the enterprises privatised by sale. For mass 
privatisation  and privatisation by dissolution the marginal effect is larger for the 
firms privatised later on. Privatisation via bankruptcy is associated with negative 
characteristics
3. There is some evidence, however, that privatisation by sale was 
pursued in the first place but then the government had to resort to other methods of 
privatisation. 
6. Conclusions
We use an extensive data-set of state-owned manufacturing firms in Poland between 
1988 and 1993 to examine the characteristics of firms  being privatised using different 
methods. Several of the firm-specific characteristics have significant effects on the 
probability of being privatised. In particular, size, profitability, short-term credit and 
trade orientation are among those with a significant effect on ownership 
transformations. Sometimes, though, the direction of these effects differs by type of 
ownership.
3 A one unit decline in profitability increases the chances of privatisation by 0.0426 for those privatised 
straight away but by 0.0613 for those privatised later.  23
Our results give strong support to the hypothesis of the importance of resource 
constraints on the choice of ownership. In particular, the coefficients by size and by 
short-term credit indicate that large firms with high financing requirement are more 
likely to be owned by outsiders. The significance of  resource constraints is confirmed 
by an analysis at the sectoral  levels. High sectoral capital intensity discourages small 
private firms. High degree of product differentiation is a constraint and a barrier to 
entry for different groups of investors, with the exception of outsiders.   
Quality measured by profitability and exporting outside the Soviet block appeals to all 
investors. Productivity can only be treated as a sign of quality to some extent. As low 
productivity firms are more likely to change  owners, this gives support to the view 
that privatisation was expected to be a way of improving efficiency. Sectoral 
characteristics such as  high concentration and low turnover  attract outsider 
ownership indicating that privatisation offers ways of entering sectors with substantial 
entry barriers.  
At the firm-level, there are no pronounced  differences between privatisation by sale 
and through mass privatisation. In fact, enterprises chosen for these two methods of 
privatisation are similar in terms of their size, profitability, export rather than 
domestic orientation. Lower growth and affiliation with low profitability sectors are 
the only indications of inferior performance of enterprises selected for mass 
privatisation. Enterprises dissolved because of bankruptcy are less profitable, show 
signs of financial distress, and tend to produce for local domestic rather than  24
international markets. There does not seem to be a deterioration of economic 
indicators in the run-up to privatisation and the enterprises selected for this method of 
privatisation suffer from long-term problems with profitability and growth. 
Privatisation by dissolution, which can be linked to insider ownership, applies to 
small but  profitable enterprises with low capital output ratio and displays 
characteristics similar to other privatisation methods. In general, there is no strong 
evidence that most profitable firms were privatised first but there is some indication 
that privatisation by sale was used before other methods. 
The beginning of transition marks the start of a process of ownership transformation. 
In the first stage the main preoccupation was with privatising the predominantly state-
owned sector. This process was initially helped by different privatisation programmes 
but will continue in the way ownership changes occur frequently in mature market 
economies. For this reason it is important to understand the determinants of 
ownership change and the characteristics that are taken into account and appeal to 
different types of owners.  
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Table 1  Firm-level characteristics and the probability of privatisation – 
multinomial logit estimates 
  Method of privatisation 










































































































Notes:   N= 8043, Log likelihood = -3050.29, Year dummies included; 
  z-values  in  brackets  29
Table 2  Past performance and the probability of privatisation – 
multinomial logit estimates 
  Method of privatisation 




























































































































Notes:   N= 6688, Log likelihood = -2769.03, Year dummies included; 
  z-values  in  brackets  30
Table 3  Firm- and industry-level characteristics and the probability of 
privatisation – multinomial logit estimates 
  Method of privatisation 





































































































































































Notes:   N= 8043, Log likelihood = -3007.66, Year dummies included 
  z-values  in  brackets  31
Table 4  Probability of privatisation – fixed effects estimates 






















































































  -12.0660 
(-5.62)
Growth    1.2441 
(2.04)
Size of state 
sector 












   -12.2171 
(-1.66)




776 776 658 776 
No  of  groups  348 348 296 348 
Log 
Likelihood 
-111.20  -214.60               -56.64  -24.27  32
Table 5 Marginal effects of firm characteristics on the probability of being privatised 
  Method of privatisation 



















Export share  0.1155
* 0.0146 0.0157 0.0039 











Export share  0.0287
* 0.0788 -0.0353 -0.0242 
Note: 
* - significant at 10% significance level  